Hackers turned up the heat.
What the French supermarket attack means for your BAS
On the night of October 11, 2026, someone reached the refrigeration controls at hundreds of French supermarkets over the internet and switched the display cases into defrost mode. Nobody broke a window or picked a lock. By the time managers arrived the next morning, freezer cases had been running as hot as 122°F for hours, the frozen food was a total loss, and several stores were dealing with fires.
We pay close attention to stories like this one because the equipment involved is a close cousin of the equipment we install and service. A supermarket refrigeration controller and an office building’s air handler controller do the same basic job: they read sensors and run sequences, and they accept commands from whoever is allowed to give them. When the wrong person is allowed to give those commands, the damage lands in the physical building, where people and product feel it right away.
This Insight walks through the French attack and a string of recent attacks on building and utility controls, and it explains what they mean for BAS security. It closes with the steps we recommend first and a free checklist you can hand to your BAS provider.
What happened in France.
The attack hit refrigeration systems at more than 500 shops and supermarkets across France, including stores run by E.Leclerc, Intermarché, Carrefour, Monoprix and Coopérative U. Intermarché’s parent company said about 150 of its stores were affected, with cases held at up to 50°C (122°F) for six hours. French broadcaster BFM TV reported that the attackers appear to have remotely triggered the systems’ forced-defrost function. That’s a normal maintenance feature — and a weapon when someone runs it on every case in every store at once.
France’s national cybersecurity agency identified the targeted equipment as refrigeration controllers made by Danfoss, including the AK-SM800 and AK-SC355 models. Danfoss said the affected units were running outdated firmware, and it said it has been telling customers for years to update supported systems and to replace legacy ones with newer equipment. On October 12, as the damage came to light, a security researcher counted 2,752 Danfoss systems reachable from the open internet, 1,590 of them in France. One threat-intelligence analyst reported affected sites in Spain, Portugal, Poland, Germany and Belgium as well. The Paris prosecutor’s office has opened an investigation, the prime minister has directed France’s national cybersecurity agency to investigate, and no group had claimed responsibility at the time of writing. Facilities Dive estimates the food losses alone at tens of millions of dollars. A Claroty security executive told the publication that remote tampering with temperature setpoints has been the industry’s biggest worry for years, and this attack made that worry real.
Three details from that story should concern anyone responsible for BAS security. The controllers could be reached from the internet. Their firmware was out of date. The attack also used a legitimate, built-in function, which means nothing on the equipment had to malfunction for the damage to happen.
France is not an isolated case.
In August 2026, attackers got into building systems at Shared Health, the provincial health organization in Manitoba, Canada. According to Facilities Dive, they took control of elevators, the HVAC monitoring system and the security office, which disrupted the hospital’s ability to issue access badges. No patient records had to be stolen for that attack to hurt. Losing control of the building was enough.
A month earlier, attackers went after water and wastewater utilities in at least 12 U.S. states. More than 30 community water systems in Minnesota were hit over a single weekend in late July, a Georgia utility issued a boil-water advisory while it confirmed its water was safe, and New Jersey operators switched to manual control to keep service running. The targets were programmable logic controllers, the same class of device that runs pumps and valves in a building plant room, and at least some of them were reachable from the open internet. Federal authorities suspect groups linked to Iran, and CISA and the FBI have issued advisories telling operators to take these devices off the internet, require multi-factor authentication and replace end-of-life software.
The research behind these incidents points the same direction. Armis Labs, the security research team at Armis, reported in October 2026 that 73% of organizations have at least one known exploited vulnerability in their building systems, and that 91% of those systems communicate over insecure protocols, including BACnet. BACnet was introduced in the 1990s, when building controls were not connected to anything, so security was never part of the original design. Armis also found that attackers have learned that shutting down a building can pressure an organization as effectively as holding its data for ransom.
None of this is new, either. In 2013, attackers broke into Target’s network with login credentials stolen from an HVAC contractor, moved through a network that was not segmented well enough to stop them, and compromised about 40 million payment cards. The contractor’s login was for billing and project management, not for running any HVAC equipment. Make no mistake — every vendor who can log into your network is part of your security, whether that vendor is your controls contractor, your refrigeration service company or your IT provider. That includes us.
What Zurich is telling building owners.
Insurers are paying attention, and that matters because insurers are usually the ones who see the bills. In an October 2026 article, Managing cyber risk in a ‘smart building’ environment, Zurich North America makes the case that building management systems now carry many of the same risks as corporate IT, often without the same protections. The article traces how building controls moved from isolated, proprietary networks to connected platforms with cloud links and remote vendor access, and it argues that this shift stripped away much of the isolation that used to protect them.
Zurich cites several numbers worth knowing. One estimate it references says roughly 44% of the more than 1.2 billion connected devices in commercial properties worldwide have weak or no security protections. It also points to IBM’s 2026 Cost of a Data Breach report, which puts the average U.S. breach at $11.5 million, more than double the global average of $4.99 million. For building owners, Zurich adds, the bigger danger is often operational, because an attack on building systems can shut down HVAC, disable access control, stop elevators or make a space unusable, and every hour of that downtime costs money.
The most useful part of the article is a set of questions Zurich suggests owners, facilities managers and IT teams work through together. In summary, they cover knowing which building systems are connected and keeping a current inventory of them, controlling who has remote access and removing it when it is no longer needed, writing cybersecurity expectations into vendor contracts, separating building systems from corporate networks, requiring multi-factor authentication, keeping legacy equipment patched or isolated, and including facilities teams in incident response plans. Zurich also recommends CISA’s 2025 asset inventory guidance for operational technology as a starting point.
BAS security: where to start.
Put the French attack, the recent hospital and water-system incidents, and Zurich’s guidance side by side, and the same handful of weak spots keeps showing up. These are the four we would look at first.
Step 1
Know what is connected.
You cannot protect a controller you do not know is on the network. Start with a written inventory of every controller, gateway, server, workstation and remote-access path in your building automation system, along with its firmware version and the people who can log into it. On older systems, that document often does not exist, or it was last updated by someone who has since moved on.
Step 2
Get your controls off the open internet.
The French controllers could be found and reached by anyone with an internet connection. CISA advises that building automation systems should not be directly reachable from the internet. From a BAS security standpoint, remote access should run through a secured path with individual user accounts and multi-factor authentication, and the BAS should sit on its own network segment, apart from guest Wi-Fi and the corporate network. A cloud-managed BMS is one clean way to get there, and our piece on cloud-managed BMS explains how it works.
Step 3
Keep firmware current, and retire what cannot be patched.
Danfoss said the units that were hit were running outdated firmware. Firmware updates on building controls are easy to postpone because the system keeps running — right up until the day it doesn’t. The problem runs deeper than firmware, because many older building systems still use communication protocols that were never designed with security in mind. Good BAS security depends on a patch schedule with a named owner. When a controller is too old to receive security updates, the honest answer is to isolate it or replace it, and that decision sits at the center of our legacy migration work.
Step 4
Treat vendor access like a set of keys.
Vendor access is where BAS security most often breaks down, and Target’s attackers got in with a contractor’s password. Every vendor login to your building systems should belong to a named person, require multi-factor authentication, reach only the systems that vendor actually services, and be shut off when the job ends or the technician leaves. If you cannot list everyone who has remote access to your BAS today, start there.
The checklist we built for this conversation.
We wrote the BAS Cybersecurity Checklist for facility managers who need to have the BAS security conversation with their BAS provider and their IT team without becoming security specialists first. It runs six pages and covers network segmentation, credentials, patch cadence and firmware, remote access, incident response, and vendor risk. Those sections line up closely with the gaps exposed in France, Manitoba and the U.S. water attacks, and the checklist is written in plain language that facilities and IT can both work from.
Free download
The BAS Cybersecurity Checklist.
These are the network questions your BAS provider should be able to answer, organized so you can work through them in one meeting.
Download the checklist →Where we fit.
For the record, we are not a cybersecurity firm, and we will tell you when a question belongs with your IT team. We design, install and service building automation systems as a Schneider Electric EcoXpert and a Johnson Controls Facility Explorer Authorized Installer. What we can do is handle the BAS security basics, making sure the controls side of your building is documented, segmented, current and reachable only by the people who should have access. If your system is aging out, our Legacy BAS Migration Playbook lays out how to plan the replacement, and a service agreement keeps firmware and credentials from drifting once the work is done.
The short version.
The freezers in France did exactly what they were told to do, and so did the elevators in Manitoba and the pumps at those water utilities. In every case, the failure was in who was allowed to give the orders. Find out who can reach your building’s controls today, and make sure the answer is a short list of people you know by name. That is where BAS security starts.
Want a second set of eyes on your BAS security? Get in touch.
Sources
- Zurich North America, Managing cyber risk in a ‘smart building’ environment, October 1, 2026
- CNBC, French supermarket fridges get hacked, heating to 122°F and sparking fires, October 13, 2026
- NPR, France investigates cyberattack that hacked retailers’ refrigeration systems, October 15, 2026
- Al Jazeera, French fridge fright: Why supermarkets have become target for hackers, October 13, 2026
- CBC News, Cyberattack defrosts French supermarket freezers, spoiling food at 100s of stores, October 2026
- Forbes, The French Supermarket Fridge Hack That Made Cyberattacks Physical, October 20, 2026
- Facilities Dive, Roundup: Building systems as cyberattack targets, October 20, 2026
- Facilities Dive, Legacy BACnet standard leaves HVAC, other building systems vulnerable to hacks, October 2, 2026
- Facilities Dive, What we know about the hacking campaign against US water systems, August 25, 2026
- NPR, U.S. HVAC Firm Reportedly Linked To Target’s Data Security Breach, February 5, 2014
- Krebs on Security, Target Hackers Broke in Via HVAC Company, February 5, 2014
- NBC News, Target Settles 2013 Hacked Customer Data Breach For $18.5 Million, May 2017
